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INTRODUCTION
The state of Minnesota established the first charter school in the
United States in 1991.1 In the roughly quarter century since then,
charter schools have experienced exponential growth.2 As of 2015,
nearly every state in the union has charter school authorizing
legislation.3 In addition to experiencing rapid growth in support among
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1. Institute of Race and Poverty, Failed Promises: Assessing Charter Schools in the Twin
Cities 1 (2008), https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/32/40/3240a8492f4c1d738fa87d975a4e5ea5/
65_2012_Update_of_IRP_2008_Charter_School_Study.pdf (on file with author) (Minnesota was
the first state to authorize and create charter schools).
2. See National Association of Public Charter Schools, Get the Facts, http://www.public
charters.org/get-the-facts/ (finding that charter school enrollment has more than doubled in the
last ten years).
3. See Preston C. Green III, Erica Frankenberg, Steven L. Nelson & Julie Rowland,
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policymakers, charter schools have also experienced growing support
among those individuals served by schools. Charter school enrollment
has now surpassed 2.5 million students and the number of individual
charter schools accounts for more than 6,500 schools.4 Minority
stakeholders are particularly motivated to attend charter schools,5 but
some scholars have warned that charter schools may jeopardize the
federally protected civil rights of minority groups.6 Charter schools—at
the national level—only comprise a small portion of the primary and
secondary school market share despite the rapid increase in charter
schools in operation, charter school enrollment, and the number of
states authorizing charter schools.7 The numbers signifying rapid
growth and a national presence of the charter school movement have
contributed to increased debate about the efficacy of charter schools to
achieve educational equity as measured by various academic
indicators8 and measures of segregation for minority students.9 Given
the relatively small market share of charter schools at the national
level, the amount of attention paid to charter schools may be

Charter Schools, Students of Color and the State Action Doctrine: Are the Rights of Students of
Color Sufficiently Protected?, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 253–275 (2012) (finding that
42 states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have charter schools. Note that
several states, chiefly Mississippi, Washington and Alabama, have passed charter school
authorizing legislation since the publication of this piece).
4. School Choice & Education: By the Numbers, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.ed
reform.com/2014/12/school-choice-education-by-the-numbers/
5. William Howell, Martin West & Paul E. Peterson, Meeting of the Minds, 11 EDUC. NEXT
20 (2011), http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_2010_Survey_Article.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Steven L. Nelson & Jennifer E. Grace, The Right to Remain Silent in New
Orleans: The Role of Non-Politically Accountable Charter School Boards in the School-to-Prison
Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2016); Steven L. Nelson, Killing Two Achievements
with One Stone: The Intersectional Impacts of Shelby County on the Rights to Vote and Access
High Performing Schools, 13 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 225 (2016) [hereinafter Killing
Two Achievements]; Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang, Choice Without
Equity: Charter School Segregation, 19 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, no. 1, 2011,
http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v19n1.2011779 [hereinafter Choice Without Equity].
7. Steven L. Nelson, Balancing School Choice and Political Voice: An Analysis of the
Legality of Public Charter Schools in New Orleans, Louisiana Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act (Dec. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University)
[hereinafter Balancing School Choice].
8. See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6 (evaluating the role of charter schools in New Orleans
on student achievement using data other than standardized tests after finding rises in state test
scores for Louisiana’s public charter schools did not
match national test scores).
9. See Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang, The Civil Rights Project,
Choice Without Equity: Charter School Segregation and the Need for Civil Rights Standards (2010),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choicewithout-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (finding that charter
schools are more segregated than traditional public schools).
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disproportionate to the actual impact of charter schools. But the debate
surrounding charter schools continues because both supporters and
skeptics of the charter school movement believe that the movement is
a harbinger of education policy to come.
This Article considers whether minority stakeholders in the charter
school movement, as currently instituted in New Orleans, have access
to the judicial protections requisite to maintain the political power
necessary to impact education policy in relative proportion to similar
opportunities that preceded the mass chartering of public schools in
New Orleans. It is necessary to investigate this potential rollback of
civil rights in education research suggesting that Black stakeholders in
New Orleans have experienced diminished opportunities for
involvement in the politics of education and educational policy—to the
detriment of Black parents and students in New Orleans.10
The majority of research on charter schools is unsettled and limited
to well-confined areas. The most prominent and comprehensive reports
on charter schools focus on academic achievement and racial
segregation. Other research explores critical areas such as student
fundamental rights in charter schools. Stanford’s Center for Research
on Education Outcome has produced multiple national analyses of
student achievement in charter schools.11 The University of California–
Los Angeles’ Civil Rights Project assembled a national review of
student segregation in charter schools.12 Likewise, some scholars have
assessed whether the rights of minority students are protected in
charter schools; this research line generally analyzes whether charter
schools, which are publicly funded but privately managed, are state
actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13 Although these issues are important in
the schema of charter school establishment, maintenance, and
expansion, they do not account for an important investigation into the
impact of charter schools on representation and political power of
10. Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6; see also Nelson & Grace, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Center for Research on Education Outcomes, Charter School Performance in
Louisiana (2013), https://credo.stanford.edu/documents/la_report_2013_7_26_2013_final.pdf
(finding that Louisiana’s charter schools have shown greater academic growth than its traditional
public schools).
12. See Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley & Wang, supra note 9 (finding that charter schools are
almost universally more segregated than traditional public schools at the national level, state and
metropolitan levels).
13. See Green, Frankenberg, Nelson & Rowland, supra note 3 (finding that federal courts
have not issued a uniform declaration on whether charter schools are state actors and the lack of
certainty around the status of charter schools as state actors or non-state actors could jeopardize
constitutional and civil rights).
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minorities on charter school boards. In fact, the literature on the impact
of charter schools on the representation and political power of
minorities on school boards is very scant. One examination of elected
charter school boards in Minnesota found that these elected school
boards result in slightly greater representation of minorities on school
boards.14 Another study found that some self-selected charter school
boards in New Orleans resulted in disproportionately White charter
school boards that usurped power from the democratically elected and
predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board.15 Although the
response rate for the study on New Orleans’ charter school boards was
low,16 the low response rate is indicative of the unaccountable and
insular nature typical of charter schools.
This Article investigates whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965 or
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States or both may serve as restraints on the
disproportionate selection of Whites on appointed charter school
boards in New Orleans. If neither of these civil rights stalwarts can
regulate the disproportionate selection of Whites on self-selected
charter school boards in New Orleans, Black parents in New Orleans
may have no, or at most limited, legal recourse to assure equitable
political participation in the arena of education policy and/or the
politics of education. Thus, Black citizens in New Orleans may
experience a decline in their proportional representation on school
boards and political power as well as their participatory abilities in the
arena of educational politics despite the continued election of a
predominately Black school board. Part I focuses on understanding
charter schools in the unique context of New Orleans’ public schools.
Parts II and III explore the use of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as remedies to the
disproportionality of White charter school board members in New
14. Melissa Stone, Jerry Zhao & Colin Cureton, Charter School Governance, Financial
Management, Educational Performance and Sustainability: Research Pilot Study Report (Hubert
H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs 2012).
15. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7; see also Steven L. Nelson, Gaining Choice and
Losing Voice: Is the New Orleans Charter School Takeover a Case of the Emperor’s New Clothes?,
in ONLY IN NEW ORLEANS: SCHOOL CHOICE AND EQUITY POST-HURRICANE KATRINA 237–66
(Luis Miron, Brian R. Beabout and Joseph Boselovic eds. 2015) [hereinafter Gaining Choice].
16. Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 (discussing that only nine charter school boards
in New Orleans responded to a survey regarding charter school board racial demographics and
finding that only six of those boards responded to inquiries about efforts to diversify charter
school boards. Likewise, only three boards were found to address racial diversity on charter
school boards via policy, and only one charter school board in New Orleans explicitly sought
racial diversity via policy).
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Orleans.
I. UNDERSTANDING CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE UNIQUE CONTEXT
OF NEW ORLEANS’ PUBLIC SCHOOLS
This Part provides a brief history of New Orleans’ public schools,
and discusses the facts leading to Louisiana’s takeover of public schools
in New Orleans. This Part also discusses the legislative and political
tools that were used to enable the takeover. Finally, this Part
contextualizes the discussion of the whereabouts and roles of the
advocates of New Orleans’ public schools during the takeover process
that led to the dismantling of the popularly elected Black school board
and to the rise of disproportionately White charter school boards.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, New Orleans’ public school
system was one of the largest (enrolling more than 63,000 students) and
most dysfunctional educational systems in the United States. The
system was plagued by White flight to surrounding parishes (the
Louisiana equivalent of counties) and middle-class Black flight to
Catholic schools.17 The Orleans Parish School Board’s mismanagement
led to a perception that New Orleans’ public schools would not and
could not educate its students.18 The signs of trouble for the faltering
school district leading up to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall included the
appointment of nine different superintendents of schools in the ten
years leading up to the takeover,19 and perennial underfunding of the
school systems, due largely to an inability to pass school taxes during
citywide elections.20 Hurricane Katrina forced the evacuation of the
city’s entire tax base, exacerbating the financial problems of the
fledgling district.21
There were other problems that predated Hurricane Katrina. The
school district experienced payroll discrepancies totaling over $12
million per year, and had upset federal officials by squandering more
than $71 million in Title I funds.22 These financial problems led to

17. Leigh Dingerson, Dismantling a Community Timeline, 90(2) HIGH SCHOOL J. 8 (2007).
18. Id.
19. United Teachers of New Orleans, Louisiana Federation of Teachers & American
Federation of Teachers, ‘National Model’ or Flawed Approach: The Post-Katrina New Orleans
Public Schools (2006), http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/AFTNational
ModelorFlawedApproach.pdf [hereinafter UTNO].
20. Dingerson, supra note 17 at 8.
21. UTNO, supra note 19.
22. Pamela Frazier-Anderson, Public Schooling in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans:
Are Charter Schools the Solution or Part of the Problem? 93(3) J. OF AFR.-AM. HIST. 410, 429
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federal indictments against numerous school officials.23 The school
district’s financial problems overshadowed its woeful academic
performance. In 2004, 63% of New Orleans’ public schools were
labeled as failing schools because of persistently low standardized test
scores and incredulously low attendance rates.24 The percentage of
students failing to meet proficiency standards had increased
substantially from 25% and 47% in 2000 and 2003, respectively.25
Likewise, the 2004 high school graduation rate was barely over 50%.26
New Orleans needed drastic school reform efforts.27 Hurricane
Katrina’s landfall offered the city of New Orleans and its schools the
educational equivalent of a mulligan.28
New Orleans is currently the center of urban education reform,29
and is on the cusp of shaking its pre-Katrina reputation as one of the
worst urban school districts in the nation.30 To many Louisiana
politicians, Hurricane Katrina was an opportunity to correct New
Orleans’ chronically poor performing and failing public schools.31
Additionally, New Orleans’ business community as well as some overly
vocal families demanded that the New Orleans public schools change
from an under-performing to a world-class school district.32
The takeover of New Orleans’ public schools was hostile despite
assertions that parents in New Orleans guided the reformation of the
city’s public schools. The autumn after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, the
state legislature passed Act 35. Act 35 wrested control of nearly all of
New Orleans’ public schools from the popularly elected Orleans Parish
School Board and placed that control in the Recovery School District
(2008).
23. Id.
24. Brian R. Beabout, Alison A. Carr-Chellman, Khaled A. Alkandari, Luis C. Almeid,
Husra T. Gursey, Ziyan Ma, Rucha S. Modak & Raymond S. Pastore, The Perceptions of New
Orleans Educators on the Process of Rebuilding the New Orleans School System after Katrina, 13
J. EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED RISK 212, 237 (2008).
25. Paul T. O’Neill and Renita K. Thukral, The Unique System of Charter Schools in New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: Distinctive Structure, Familiar Challenges, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT.
L. 319 (2010).
26. Id.
27. Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22.
28. Beabout et al., supra note 24, at 212–37.
29. Kristin Buras, ‘We’re Not Going Nowhere’: Race, Urban Space and the Struggle for King
Elementary School in New Orleans, 54 CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUC., 19, 32 (2012).
30. O’Neill & Thukral, supra note 25.
31. Brian R. Beabout, Stakeholder Organizations: Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans
Public Schools, MULTICULTURAL EDUC., 43–49 (2007).
32. Luis Miron, The Urban School Crisis in New Orleans: Pre and Post-Katrina Perspectives,
13 J.EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED RISK 238, 258 (2008).
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(RSD), a state-run school district with appointed leadership. The state
takeover occurred despite resistance from the New Orleans delegation
to the Louisiana legislature.33 Act 3534 allowed the state of Louisiana to
take unilateral control of the majority of schools in New Orleans,35 and
dismantled the traditional power structure of the New Orleans’ public
schools through a state takeover (and the subsequent chartering of the
city’s schools).36 The Orleans Parish School Board saw the vast majority
of its responsibilities over schools and its policymaking powers
immediately terminated.37
Act 35 did not affect all school districts equally.38 Additionally, Act
35 increased the School Performance Score (a state calculation used to
determine a school’s academic success rate) that would label a school
as failing.39 The increase amounted to between 27 and 45 points on a
scale between 0 and 200.40 The criteria also disregarded the previous
requirement of four years of failing school performance to require the
state to conduct a school takeover.41 Act 35, in essence, expanded the
definition of a failing school to include schools that were not previously
labeled as failing, including some that had recently been commended
for exemplary performance.42 The Louisiana legislature had, without
warning, changed the rules on public education stakeholders in New
Orleans.
The RSD quickly assumed leadership over the vast majority of New
Orleans’ schools.43 The takeover, however, was not well planned.
33. Dingerson, supra note 17, at 8.
34. 2005 La. Acts 2538–39 (codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN § 17:10.7 (2015)).
35. Miron, supra note 32.
36. Brian R. Beabout, Leadership for Change in the Educational Wild West of Post-Katrina
New Orleans, 11 J. EDUC. CHANGE 403, 424 (2010).
37. Dirk Tillotson, What’s Next for New Orleans? 90 HIGH SCHOOL J. 69–74 (2007).
38. UTNO, supra note 19. According to this report, one way of triggering Act 35 was to have
30 academically unacceptable schools. Contemporaneous to Act 35’s passage, only a handful of
school districts contained 30 schools. Of the few school districts that would have qualified for state
takeover under Act 35, the state of Louisiana refused to conduct a state takeover of any of those
school districts.
39. Id. at 19.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Act 35’s effect was to allow the state to seize 102 of New Orleans’ public schools in
one action, adding to the previous 5 New Orleans schools that had been previously taken over by
the state. See Tillotson, supra note 36. Likewise, the state of Louisiana had only taken over 13
schools—statewide—prior to Act 35’s promulgation. See UTNO, supra note 19.
43. Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22 (finding evidence that the Louisiana legislature did not
intend to create a mass charter school movement). In the same legislative session that the
legislature approved Act 35, the legislature voted to limit the number of charter schools
established throughout the state. See UTNO, supra note 19.
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Teacher shortages, a lack of facilities, and construction delays all
complicated student enrollment.44 The RSD opted to charter many of
New Orleans’ public schools after realizing that the state of Louisiana
could not run schools in New Orleans much better than the Orleans
Parish School Board had run the schools. The rapid increase in school
performance scores (based primarily on state standardized test scores)
after the mass chartering in New Orleans produced a perception that
charter schools might have had the ability to revive the still-struggling
public schooling system.45 In effect, however, the charter school
takeover was not well planned, but rather “pave as you go.”46 The state
of Louisiana continues to lack a clear, consistent and manageable plan
to successfully educate students in New Orleans as evidenced by the
fact that the RSD has several times amended its strategy for returning
New Orleans’ public schools to local control.47 The practical result is
that self-selected charter school boards who are not politically
accountable unilaterally determine when the city’s schools will return
to local and politically accountable governance.48
Charter schools in New Orleans arose from legislative fiat,
executive order, and federal intervention.49 In addition to the passage
of Act 35, the United States Department of Education (DOE), through
then-Secretary Margaret Spellings, waived many federal restrictions on
charter schools, which enabled the mass chartering of the city’s public
schools.50 Likewise, the DOE donated millions of dollars to assist with
the start-up funds required to jumpstart charter schools in New
Orleans.51 Given the district’s lack of a tax base to support the
reopening of public schools, the influx of money from the DOE was
instrumental in reestablishing the city’s public schools, especially those
that would have converted to charter schools. Meanwhile, thenGovernor Kathleen Blanco removed requirements mandating parental
and faculty support for the conversion of traditional public schools into
44. Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22.
45. Nelson Smith, The Louisiana Recovery School District: Lessons for the Buckeye State
(Thomas Fordham Inst. 2012), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED528943.pdf.
46. Beabout, supra note 36, at 403–424.
47. Smith, supra note 45.
48. Danielle Dreilinger, Recovery Schools Back to Orleans Parish? House Panel Says OK,
9-8, NOLA.COM (May 12, 2015; 6:41 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/05/bill_
returning_rsd_schools_to.html (discussing the Louisiana state legislatures debate over returning
adequately performing, previously state-taken over schools to local and elected control in light of
higher academic achievement among New Orleans’ public schools).
49. Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22.
50. Dingerson, supra note 17, at 8.
51. Id.
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charter schools; thus, charter school entrepreneurs had very few
obstacles to overcome in conducting a hostile takeover of schools in
New Orleans.52 At the same time, pro-charter groups dominated thenMayor C. Ray Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission while no
seats were reserved for parents or teachers from New Orleans’ public
schools.53 The pro-charter domination of federal, state, and local
positions pertaining to education allowed the pro-charter groups to
create the perception of a false dichotomy:either charter schools or no
schools.54
The timing of Act 35’s passage appears clandestine and nefarious,
at best. The Louisiana legislature passed Act 35 when the greater share
of more affluent and White neighborhoods had been spared from the
city’s worst flooding while predominately Black neighborhoods
suffered disproportionately catastrophic damage.55 By October 2005,
many local White communities and middle-class Black communities
were on the mend, having already experienced substantial recession of
floodwaters and had been allowed by the government to return to their
homes.56 Poorer Black neighborhoods did not have similar fortunes.57
White families and middle-class Black families dominated the
population that first returned to the city of New Orleans.58 These
families did not, however, previously use the public schools in large
numbers.59 Efforts to rebuild New Orleans’ poorest and most Black
neighborhoods moved at a glacial pace, but efforts to displace Black
New Orleanians’ power over education policy and the politics of
education moved much more rapidly.60 These facts have led some
scholars to believe that divestment in Black communities was
purposeful.61 Most importantly, those parents and students who had
previously forsaken the public schools in New Orleans wielded
disproportionate political power and voice in the rebuilding of New
Orleans’ public schools. The resultant system of schools in New Orleans
consists of a series of predominately White, self-selected charter school
52. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Dingerson, supra note 17, at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Dingerson, supra note 17.
60. Joshua Akers, Separate and Unequal: The Consumption of Public Education in PostKatrina New Orleans, 36 INT’L J. URB & REGIONAL RES. 29, 48 (2012).
61. Buras, supra note 29.
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boards governing nearly exclusively Black public schools in a city with
a voting age population that is predominately Black. This system
represents a significant divergence from the popularly elected,
predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board that operated prior
to Hurricane Katrina and reflected the demographic of the city’s voting
age population.62
II. OPPORTUNITY (DIS)MISSED: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS NO
DEFENSE TO DISPROPORTIONATE APPOINTMENT OF WHITE
CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS
Given this understanding of the way in which self-selected charter
school boards in New Orleans are predominately White and displace
the political power of a predominately Black board, an initial inquiry
considers how the Voting Rights Act might protect the predominately
Black electors in New Orleans. Prior to the Court’s 2013 holding in
Shelby County v. Holder,63 the city of New Orleans was a Section 5
jurisdiction, meaning the state of Louisiana needed specific
permissions from the federal government to alter electoral practices.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was specifically designed to
intervene in the situation that presented itself to the voters of New
Orleans, for the situation in New Orleans was one in which the state
created a predominately White appointed and later predominately
White self-selected school boards to supersede the power of the
predominately Black, popularly elected school board. The Supreme
Court, having expelled Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act and leaving
Section 5 temporarily unenforceable in Shelby County v. Holder, left
the voters of New Orleans with only Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
as a potential remedy for this possible violation of the Voting Rights
Act.64 Part II of this article discusses the history and current
applicability of the Voting Rights Act to the circumstances of the New
Orleans charter school takeover.

62. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
63. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
64. Id.
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A. Background on the Voting Rights Act
Long before the Voting Rights Act of 1965,65 Congress had
attempted to intervene in the disenfranchisement of Blacks.66 Yet states
continued to find alternate paths to exclude Blacks from the political
process although the Fifteenth Amendment purportedly assured
protection from disenfranchisement.67 The restrictions of the Fifteenth
Amendment had proven generally powerless in remedying the
disenfranchisement of Blacks in the U.S. and appeared almost
nonexistent in the South.68 Key anti-civil rights events, such as Bloody
Sunday, occurred in 1965 and forced Congress to act more stridently to
protect the voting rights of Blacks.69
Sections 2 and 5 are the broadest and most restrictive protections
under the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 of the Act prohibits the denial
or abridgement of the right to participate in the political process by way
of a nationwide blanket prohibition. Section 2’s prohibitions
purposefully lack specificity and are generally applicable to any and all
efforts at violating the right to vote. Because little progress had been
made at the national level to ensure Blacks’ right to the electoral
franchise was protected, Congress saw fit to establish Section 2.70
Section 2’s protections are, unfortunately, remedial in nature; thus,
potential plaintiffs must suffer some identifiable harm before the
judiciary will intervene.71 Section 5, on the other hand, applied
specifically to jurisdictions that had proven to be ineffective at
protecting the right of Blacks to participate in the electoral process, or
worse had been instrumental in preventing the exercise of that same
right.72 Thus, Section 5 granted the federal government heightened
65. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (2012)).
66. The Fifteenth Amendment, passed during Reconstruction, was previously the most
notable attempt at remedying voter disenfranchisement. Though partially successful, the
Fifteenth Amendment’s effectiveness faded as the Reconstruction period ended. Due in part to
extreme violence and intimidation, Black Americans—mostly former slaves and their
descendants—remained largely unable to access the electoral franchise.
67. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
68. In particular, the southern region of the United States saw little to no results of previous
voting rights activism and other parts of the nation saw little to no results. See S. REP. NO. 97-417,
at 5 (1982).
69. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
70. See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 5 (1982); see also U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, http://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8,
2015) [hereinafter DOJ Section 2].
71. See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6 (1982); see also DOJ Section 2, supra note 70.
72. See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 5–6 (1982); see also Killing Two Achievements, supra
note 6 (discussing the impact of the holding of Shelby County on educational equity, in particular
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oversight of the electoral processes in jurisdictions covered under the
section with the understanding that these jurisdictions were more likely
to create or be obstinate in removing obstacles to Blacks’ right to vote.73
Unlike Section 2’s protections, Section 5’s protections are, therefore,
preemptive. Section 4 of the Act provided the formula to determine
which jurisdictions were covered under Section 5 and likewise
determined when jurisdictions covered under Section 5 could be
relieved of the duty to obtain federal permission to alter voting
processes.74 The Supreme Court held Section 4 unconstitutional in
Shelby County v. Holder,75 as discussed below. Section 5 is
unenforceable without an enforceable Section 4. Without Section 5,
minority stakeholders may have only Section 2’s remedial protections,
and Section 2’s applicability is uncertain as related to nonelected
school boards. Thus, minority stakeholders may not have an assured
pathway to racial representation, if not parity, on self-selected charter
school boards.
Since its initial passage, the Voting Rights Act has evolved in many
ways. Before the Act reached 20 years old, it had experienced several
reauthorizations and amendments that prompted new interpretations
to the Act.76 Through the first fifteen years of existence, the Court
maintained that the Act prohibited voting schemes that diluted the
voting power of Blacks.77 In 1980, the Court reversed course and found
violative of the Act only voting schemes that intentionally abridged or
denied the voting rights of minorities.78 After the Court’s holding in
City of Mobile v. Bolden,79 a plaintiff’s burdens of proof would be much
higher in order to sustain an allegation of a violation of the Voting
Rights Act.80
Congress quickly amended the Voting Rights Act after the Bolden
decision.81 The amended Section 2 allowed plaintiffs to prove their
considering how Section 5 would prevent states from vacillating between structures to limit Black
political power in setting agendas in education policy and the politics of education); U.S. Dep’t.
of Justice, About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Shelby County Decision,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015)
[hereinafter DOJ Section 5].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
76. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
77. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973).
78. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion).
79. Id.
80. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
81. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982); see also
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Voting Rights Act cases without proving intentionality or otherwise
purposeful discrimination.82 Congress’ amendment to Section 2
returned a Voting Rights Act plaintiff’s burden of proof to the level
where the plaintiff needed only to demonstrate a discriminatory
impact.83 The Supreme Court first considered the amended Section 2 in
Thornburg v. Gingles.84 In Thornburg, the Court found that the
amended Section 2 established that the appropriate test for a Section 2
case was the “results test” as opposed to the Bolden “intent test.”85
Congress had previously openly questioned the efficacy of an intent
test to remedy all procedures that jeopardize the electoral franchise as
well as the impact of the intent test on community relations in
enumerating reasons for rejecting the intent test in favor of the results
test.86
The language of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as of the 1982
amendments to the Act, is codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301.87 It now states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or
in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that
the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section
S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982).
82. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 63.
86. Id. at 35.
87. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2015) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
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establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.88

Although Section 2 has been interpreted as a robust protection of
voting rights, Section 5 was by far the preferred provision of the Voting
Rights Act for claims of denial and/or abridgement, when applicable.
The Supreme Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act—
practically ending Section 5 enforcement—and left many minority
communities with only the remedial measures of Section 2 in lieu of the
more powerful and preemptive measures of Section 5. States might now
be free to gerrymander electoral districts to assure political victories
for candidates that are not particularly in favor of the political ideals
shared by Black communities.89 Although the United States
Department of Justice, through the Attorney General, continues to file
multiple actions under Section 2, there is evidence supporting the claim
that ending Section 5 enforcement has aided in the retrenchment of
voting rights protections in the Deep South.90
This retrenchment is occurring despite the fact that Blacks in the
Deep South continue to play a critical role in national politics.91 Of
course, Black voters were pivotal in electing President Barack
Obama—the first Black president—to the White House, but the ability
of Blacks to control more local politics may be in jeopardy.92 In Senate
and congressional elections, Black voters are important in electing
moderate or liberal Whites to office.93 In the case of Louisiana, thenSenator Mary Landrieu, a moderate Democrat, relied on a large Black
turnout to maintain her political position.94 Some commentators argue
that Blacks are not experiencing the electoral success at the state level

88. Id.
89. See Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 (discussing the impact of the holding of
Shelby County on educational equity, in particular considering how Section 5 would prevent states
from vacillating between structures to limit Black political power in setting agendas in education
policy and the politics of education); see also Damian Williams, Reconstructing Section 5: A PostKatrina Proposal for Vot-ing Rights Act Reform, 116 YALE L.J. 1116 (2007) (discussing the
general lack of protection of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act for citizens of New Orleans).
90. See, e.g., Jason Zingerle, The New Racism: This is How the Civil Rights Movement Ends,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119019/civil-rightsmovement-going-reverse-alabama; Myrna Perez & Vishal Agraharkar, The Brennan Center For
Justice Analysis, If Section 5 Falls: New Voting Implications, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/Section_5_New_Voting_Implications.pdf (on file with author).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
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as they are at the national level.95 This is true in Louisiana where both
state houses are reliably conservative. More important to this Article,
the charter school movement, as currently instituted in New Orleans,
produces disproportionately and predominately White self-selected
charter school boards that do not particularly pursue diversification.96
Moreover, there is research to show that these boards’ inability to
secure Black membership in combination with political insulation
results in poorer academic accountability.97
As legal scholars begin to discuss the intersection of movements to
assure educational equity and access to the electoral franchise, it is
important to note that these two civil rights struggles are very
interdependent.98 In many ways, the Court’s dismissal of Section 4 can
be properly understood as another setback in the effort towards
educational equity.99 When reviewing pertinent legal cases, it becomes
apparent that issues of educational equity and/or equal educational
access have not been a top priority for the Court in recent years.100 The
Court’s decision in Shelby County, while ostensibly not an issue of
educational equity, may have practical effects on the ability of Black
New Orleanians to obtain, maintain and retain political involvement at
the local (especially school board) level.101
The next section will examine whether, under the extant language
of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause, the current
circumstances in New Orleans produce a viable civil rights-based claim.
Such a claim would assume that Black political participation and voice
are critical to securing greater Black participation on school boards and
thereby gaining greater educational equity for the largely Black
student body of New Orleans’ public schools.102 In the alternative, the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Zingerle, supra note 90.
Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6.
See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6, at 233–39.
Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
See MICHAEL BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, TEN THOUSAND DEMOCRACIES: POLITICS
AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA’S SCHOOL DISTRICTS (Georgetown University Press 2010);
Ted Robinson, Robert England & Kenneth Meier, Black Resources and Black School Board
Representation: Does Political Structure Matter? 66 SOC. SCIENCE Q. 976 (1985); Kenneth Meier
& Rober England, Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They related? 78 AM. POL.
SCIENCE REV., 392 (1984). But see Joseph Stewart, Jr., Robert England & Kenneth Meier, Black
Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to Office to Classroom, 42 W. POL.
Q., 287 (questioning the relationship between descriptive representation and substantive
representation).
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Court’s holding in Shelby County could represent an additional
obstacle to educational equity for Black students in New Orleans’
public schools.
B. The Application of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act to NonElected School Boards
The most relevant statute for addressing the selection of nonelected school board members is Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Section 2 is the nationwide ban on electoral processes that
disenfranchise or limit the political participation of minority voters.103
Few federal courts, however, have addressed the selection of nonelected school board members under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act;104 and those that have addressed the intersection of Section 2 and
non-elected school boards have been hostile to such efforts. The Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have conducted these
analyses and have reached generally similar conclusions as to whether
the Voting Rights Act applies to the use of non-elected school boards.
After the most recent case involving the application of Section 2 to
non-elected school boards, the question of whether Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act applies to non-elected school boards was partially
resolved. Two of three federal courts addressing the applicability of
Section 2 to non-elected school boards have explicitly rejected the use
of Section 2 to regulate non-elected boards. The remaining court
suggested that Section 2 might apply to non-elected school boards if
the selection process had a disparate racial impact. Given more recent
Supreme Court precedent, even the application of a disparate impact
analysis—the only extant argument for using Section 2 to address nonelected school boards—does not appear to be likely.
In Searcy v. Williams,105 the Fifth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to assess the legality of a non-elected school board.106
In Searcy, the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of an
independent, public school system for Thomaston, Georgia from the
pre-existing R. E. Lee Institute.107 The faltering financial status of the
103. Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 at 228.
104. Importantly, the state of Louisiana has a constitutional provision requiring that the state
establish popularly elected school boards to govern the public schools of each parish. This
constitutional provision has not been interpreted to ban the establishment of other, more
powerful and unelected school board. Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 at 228.
105. 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 1005.
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private, all-White R. E. Lee Institute jeopardized the education of
White students in Thomaston.108 The authorizing statute required that
the R. E. Lee Institute’s board of trustees become the Thomaston
Board of Education.109 Board of education members in Thomaston
would, under the new statute, continue to be “elected”110 in the same
manner in which they were selected prior to the creation of the new,
public school system.111 Previously, each year one member of the board
of education would retire, and the board of education, including the
retiring member, would choose the next member of the board.112 The
statute creating the new school system was approved by referendum in
1918 and reauthorized several times (though the only method of entry
onto the board of education remained a self-perpetuating form of
selection).113
The board of education continued to effectuate explicitly racist
policies upon its transition to a public entity. During desegregation,
White traditions were uniformly adopted in lieu of Black traditions.114
Until the time immediately preceding the lawsuit in Searcy, no Black
had ever been “elected” to the board of education.115 The public
seemingly endorsed the policies of the board of education as it
repeatedly voted overwhelmingly to keep the system in Thomaston as
it existed despite the evident exclusion of Black stakeholders.116 The
board appointed its first Black man to service only after the initiation
of the lawsuit.117 The board of education, after the historic appointment,
adopted an anti-discrimination and affirmative action policy to fill
vacant seats.118
The Fifth Circuit later found the operation of the board to be
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.119 The appeals
court did not reach the plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act claim but did note
the district court’s appropriate decision that Section 2 of the Voting

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The federal courts found that this system was not actually an election but rather an
appointment process.
111. Id. at 1005.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1005–1006.
115. Id. at 1006.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1010.
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Rights Act does not apply to appointive selection schemes.120 In holding
that the school board selection process violated the plaintiffs’
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court focused on
the discriminatory origins of the legislation and the continued
discriminatory effects of the legislation.121 This holding vindicated the
plaintiffs’ claims and dispatched the Voting Rights Act issues.122 The
court found no reason to consider the Voting Rights Act claim because
the plaintiff’s primary issue (the discriminatory nature of the school
board) had been resolved.123
The next federal appellate court to address the applicability of
Section 2 to non-elected boards was the Fourth Circuit. In Irby v.
Virginia State Board of Elections,124 the court did not resolve whether
Section 2 applied to appointed positions but instead reserved opinion
on that question for a later case.125 In Irby, the plaintiffs alleged that the
appointive system of selecting school board members, which until
federal intervention consistently produced exclusively White boards,
was conceived and maintained for a discriminatory purpose.126 The
plaintiffs, in particular, alleged that this system was a violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.127 According to the district court,
the appointment of local school boards in Virginia dated back to
1870.128 Furthermore, there was no racially discriminatory intent in
requiring appointed school boards at the onset of the policy.129 The
district court could not determine whether the modifications and
alterations up to the turn of the century to the appointive system were
motivated by racially discriminatory intentions.130 After the turn of the
century, the appointive scheme was maintained with the purpose of
limiting the opportunities to select Black school board members.131
Over the next three decades, the state legislature made several changes
to the appointive system.132 Notwithstanding the discriminatory history
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Searcy without
opinion in Searcy v. Hightower, 455 U.S. 984 (1982).
123. Searcy, 656 F.2d at 1010.
124. 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989).
125. See id. at 1357.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1353.
128. Id. at 1354.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1354–56.
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of the selection process, the district court found that no discriminatory
intent existed in maintaining the appointive system over an elective
system.133
The Fourth Circuit found the establishment and maintenance of the
appointive scheme lacked a discriminatory purpose and a
discriminatory impact.134 According to the district court, the percentage
of Blacks on school boards in Virginia (under the appointive scheme)
was not statistically different than the percentage of Blacks in the
voting age population.135 In fact, the actual percentage of Blacks on
appointed school boards in Virginia exactly mirrored the percentage of
Blacks in the voting age population.136 Similar statistics were true of the
individual cities and counties at issue in Irby.137 Of the five jurisdictions
in Irby, only Buckingham and Halifax counties saw statistically
significant differences in the percentage of Blacks in the voting age
populations and the percentage of Blacks on the school board.138 Other
variables—aside from racial discrimination—could explain the
statistical differences in Buckingham and Halifax counties.139 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court in determining that the
appointive system of choosing school board members did not have a
discriminatory impact.140
The Fourth Circuit deliberately left open the question of the
applicability of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the use of
appointive school boards.141 The court intimated that Section 2 might
133. Id. at 1354. The state of Virginia did allow Arlington County to begin electing its school
board in 1947, but this authorization to elect the school board in Arlington County was revoked
after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in an attempt to “impede Arlington’s
ability to comply with court-ordered desegregation.” Irby, 889 F.2d at 1354. Finally, there were
several attempts to enact an elective scheme for selecting school board members in Virginia, but
all of those attempts failed. Id. The district court found that there was no discriminatory intent in
keeping the appointive scheme. Id at 1355. The Fourth Circuit found no error in the judgment of
the district court and concluded that Virginia’s appointive scheme for choosing school board
members did not have a discriminatory purpose. Id. The court accepted several nonracist reasons
why the Virginia state legislature found appointive school boards favorable as opposed to
appointed school boards. Id. These reasons included providing diversity that might not be
achieved through election, avoiding single-issue campaigns that are frequent in school board
elections and protecting school boards from direct political pressures among many others provide.
Id.
134. Id. at 1358.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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be inapplicable to non-elective systems of selection; however, the court
also refused to hold that Section 2 did not apply to appointive systems
for choosing officials.142 The court thus departed from the approach of
its sister circuits143 and ignored arguments that no citizens were allowed
to vote.144 The Fourth Circuit dispatched Irby by applying a Section 2
analysis and found that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was not
applicable in this particular case but perhaps could be in another case
that is similar but not identical.145
To reach its conclusion, the court examined whether the appointive
system produced racially discriminatory and disparate effects.146
Although the court acknowledged that Black representation was not
statistically proportional in the jurisdictions challenged, the court held
that mere statistical incongruence was insufficient evidence to assert a
claim under Section 2.147 In three of the five jurisdictions challenged in
Irby, adding just one additional Black member to the school board
would remedy any statistical difference in the percentage of Blacks in
the voting age population and the percentage of Blacks on the school
board.148 There was one jurisdiction with a vast difference in Black
representatives and the Black voting age population; however, every
Black person that requested to serve on the school board had been
selected.149 Another jurisdiction had had Blacks nominated for school
board positions, but the Black nominees had willfully withdrawn before
appointment.150
The Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining
challenges. The court did not allow the plaintiffs to challenge the racial
composition of the appointing officers; according to the Irby court,
challenges to the composition of elected bodies must be made as direct
challenges against those bodies under the Voting Rights Act, not as to
their actions.151 The court stated that the mere fact that White officials
made appointments is not enough to prove racial discrimination.152 The
142. Id. at 1357.
143. See Balancing School Choice, supra note 7 (finding that almost all federal courts have
found that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies only to elected positions).
144. Irby, 889 F. 2d at 1357.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1357–59.
147. Id. at 1358–59.
148. Id. at 1358.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1359.
152. Id.
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Fourth Circuit, therefore, kept open the door to allege a Section 2
violation although it had dismissed the Section 2 claims of the Irby
plaintiffs.
Only one other federal appeals court has addressed the application
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to non-elected selection processes.
The Sixth Circuit confronted the intersection of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act and appointed school boards in Mixon v. Ohio.153 In Mixon,
voters and taxpayers of the Cleveland School District sought to have
Ohio Substitute House Bill 269 declared unconstitutional.154 H.B. 269
changed the composition and the number of members on the
Cleveland School Board by allowing the Mayor of Cleveland to
appoint the new school board of a district that consists primarily of
portions of Cleveland with the addition of areas from four adjacent
jurisdictions.155 Prior to granting the Mayor of Cleveland the right to
mayoral control of the school board, school district voters selected
school board members in a public election.156 Mixon, unlike previous
federal voting rights act cases, brought into question whether the
transition from an elective method to an appointive method of
choosing the school board in Cleveland abridged or denied minorities’
right to vote in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.157 The
Sixth Circuit resolved this question with a resounding “no.”158
The primary effect of H.B. 269 was to convert the Cleveland School
Board from elected to appointed.159 This type of change is
presumptively valid based largely on Supreme Court dicta.160 The
school board would no longer be chosen in a popular election; instead,
the mayor would appoint the board members from a list of nominees
presented by a nominating committee. Furthermore, the legislation
made a provision for the board to convert into a self-selected board,
one in which the board would select its own successors.161 H.B. 269
provided specific limitations on who could serve on the nomination

153. 193 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999).
154. Id. at 393.
155. Id. at 394–95.
156. Id.
157. Recall that the plaintiffs in Searcy and Irby contested the maintenance of a previously
appointed boards.
158. See generally Mixon, 139 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999).
159. Id. at 407
160. See id. at 407 (clarifying the roots of the legality of transitioning elected boards to
appointed boards and also justifying the Ohio legislature’s actions).
161. Id. at 395.
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committee as well as who could be chosen as a nominee.162 For instance,
the nominating committee was required to consist of:
(i.) Three parents or guardians of children attending the
schools in the municipal
(ii.) Three persons appointed by the mayor (i.e., the Mayor of
Cleveland);
(iii.)One person appointed by the president of the legislative
body of the municipal corporation containing the greatest
portion of the municipal school district’s territory (i.e.,
Cleveland)
(iv.)One teacher appointed by the collective bargaining
representative of the school district’s teachers;
(v.) One principal appointed through a vote, conducted by the
State Superintendent, of the school district’s principal; and
(vi.)One representative of the business community appointed
by an organized collective business entity selected by the
mayor; and
(vii.)One president of a public or private institution of higher
education located within the municipal school district
appointed by the State Superintendent.163

Furthermore, the slate of nominees from which the mayor would
choose the school board was required to fulfill certain requirements.
No nominee could be an elected public official and all nominees had to
be residents of the municipal school district.164 At least one member of
the selected school board was required to reside in the municipal school
district outside of the city of Cleveland.165 Four of nine selected board
members were required to show, prior to appointment, expertise in a
field related to the operation of schools.166 The board, after the first
thirty days, could use self-selection to compose the school board; until
that time, the mayor reserved the right to appoint school board
members.167 The new system of selecting school board members in
Cleveland, as enacted in H.B. 269, was without doubt an appointive
system as opposed to an elective system;168 perhaps the system was

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 395–96.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 410.
In many instances within this case, the Sixth Circuit implies, if not explicitly states, that
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even self-selected because after six months the new school board would
independently—and with very little political accountability to its
stakeholders—control its own composition.169 Nevertheless, the Sixth
Circuit held that the transition away from an elective school board
system did not trigger Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.170
The federal appellate courts have made clear that the protections
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act do not extend to all forms of
selection processes. In Mixon, the Sixth Circuit held that Section 2
applies only to elective, not appointive systems; in many ways, Mixon
might also ban the application of Section 2 to even self-selected public
governing boards. The court cited both Searcy and Irby, described
above. In addressing the issue of Section 2’s ability to regulate
appointed school boards, the Sixth Circuit borrowed from analogous
precedent in non-school board cases to explain its stance. The court
found that all federal courts addressing the issue of the applicability of
Section 2 to appointed offices had found that Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act did not apply.171
In addition to relying on its sister circuits, the Sixth Circuit
interpreted the language of the Voting Rights Act itself. The plain
language of the Voting Rights Act indicates that Section 2 only covers
the election and nomination of representatives, not appointed
officials.172 The court also found that the legislative intent of the Voting
Rights Act dictated that appointed systems could not be held to the
same account as elective systems.173 In reaching this conclusion, the
Sixth Circuit did not give proper credit to relevant legislative history
regarding the use of appointive systems as “cursory language.”174 The
court expressed a fear that allowing challenges to appointive systems
of selection could result in a slippery slope of allowing retroactive
challenges to governmental choices of how to select officials.175 The
there is no constitutional or federal statutory restriction on the selection process of administrative
units in government.
169. Mixon,139 F.3d at 410.
170. See id. at 389.
171. Id. at 406–07. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis was somewhat of an overstatement because
the analysis does not give proper credit to the Fourth Circuit’s argument that Section 2 might
apply to appointed school boards given a disparate impact on minority voters.
172. Id. at 407–08.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 408. This language is considered cursory, although the legislative history of the
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act specifically mentions the conversion of elected posts
to appointed posts. On the contrary, the Sixth Circuit found persuasive the dicta from a Supreme
Court case in holding in this very case.
175. Id.
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Sixth Circuit also noted the Supreme Court’s affirmation, without
comment, in Searcy.176 The language of the Voting Rights Act,
according to Mixon, mandated a judicial interpretation foregoing the
application of Section 2 of the Act to appointed school boards.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s disparate impact analysis in Irby is the
only remaining link between Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
appointed and/or self-selected school boards.177 Unfortunately, more
recent updates to the Supreme Court’s disparate impact jurisprudence
indicate that a disparate impact analysis under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act is uncertain.178 The sum of federal court cases addressing the
application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to school boards—
other than those elected—limit the possibility of Black parents in New
Orleans challenging the self-selection of charter school boards and
concomitantly limits the ability of Black parents in New Orleans to
impact education policy and the politics of education.
C. New Orleans’ Voters, the State Takeover of New Orleans’ Public
Schools and the Preclearance Requirement of § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act
If Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not protect the right of
Black voters in New Orleans to participate in and influence education
policy and the politics of education through the electoral process, Black
voters in New Orleans may seek relief under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Section 5, prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby
County v. Holder,179 was the most restrictive and powerful provision of
the Voting Rights Act. Although all jurisdictions in the United States
are Voting Rights Act Section 2 jurisdictions, the jurisdictions with the
most heinous pasts in terms of assuring the voting rights and political

176. Id.
177. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
178. Under Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), Congress must authorize private
claims for disparate impact analysis in the statutory language that it promulgates. Sandoval
creates no problems for Voting Rights Act litigation; Congress, through Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, has explicitly authorized disparate impact analysis for Voting Rights Act claims. See
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012). Section 2 clears one hurdle established in Sandoval. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has already established that private parties may file suit for enforcement under
the Voting Rights Act using disparate impact analysis. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986). This clears a second hurdle created by Sandoval to private suits asserting disparate impact.
These combined facts result in a finding that Sandoval does not and cannot apply to Voting Rights
Act claims, regardless of whether those claims are initiated under intentional discrimination suits
or disparate impact suits.
179. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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participation of minorities are Section 5 jurisdictions.180 Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act requires that those jurisdictions, determined by
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, that have a history steeped in the
disenfranchisement of ethnic and racial minorities must petition the
federal government to make changes to the voting procedures.181 New
Orleans was a Section 5 jurisdiction; in fact, the entire state of
Louisiana was a Section 5 jurisdiction.182
1. The Creation of the State Takeover District and Appointed
Charter School Boards in New Orleans Was a Change in Voting
Procedures in New Orleans
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires changes in the voting
procedures in the city of New Orleans to be evaluated and approved
by the federal government.183 When the state of Louisiana stripped the
popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board of its power and
transferred that power to an appointed, state-run school board,184 there
was effectively a change in voting procedures. Searcy instructs that the
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not impact non-elected
boards,185 but the creation of new, appointed board to replace the old,
elected board is a violation of the Voting Rights Act if there is no
preclearance.186 The popular retort to attestations that the transfer of
power from the popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board to the
appointed, state-run Recovery School District is that the transfer of
power was not permanent in New Orleans.187 At first glance, this
argument holds up. The pre-Katrina New Orleans public schools were
in shambles, as was the school district’s tax base.188 Due to outside
pressures (encouragement by the federal government in the form of
financial support and coercion by the state in the form of executive
180. DOJ Section 5, supra note 72; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417 at 6, (1982) reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177.
181. See Williams, supra note 90, at 1116 (discussing how Section 5 was not robust enough to
account for the situation that Hurricane Katrina introduced to the predominately Black (67
percent) city of New Orleans).
182. See id.
183. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 (identifying the
transition between elective and appointive systems as being of paramount concern to protecting
the voting rights of Blacks).
184. See generally Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6.
185. See Searcy v. Williams, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Voting Rights Act
does not apply to boards that are not elected and suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is a more appropriate method of regulating non-elected boards).
186. Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6.
187. Gaining Choice, supra note 15, at 246–47.
188. See id.
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orders and legislation) as well as necessity (the city had to react to the
return of its student body, which had no schools at the time), the district
almost had to convert the majority of its schools into charter schools.189
With very few options and even less time, the schools were opened in
the most immediate manner available.190 Although the state takeover
of New Orleans’ public schools was temporary, more than a decade
after the state’s takeover of the city’s public schools it is clear that the
schools would not be returned to the governance of the popularly
elected school board in the near future.191 It is incontrovertible that the
state is unable to justify the conversion of elected posts to
appointed/self-selected posts in perpetuity, but it is equally
preposterous to assume that withholding political power from a
previously empowered group for a decade—and likely longer—meets
the approval of Section 5 without preclearance.
2. The Court’s Decision in Shelby County v. Holder May Negate
Any Retroactive Section 5 Preclearance Violation in New
Orleans
When the popularly elected and predominately Black Orleans
Parish School Board experienced a decrease in its governing powers,
the state of Louisiana, which initiated the change from an elected
school board ultimately to self-selected charter school boards, should
have requested preclearance from the United States Department of
Justice or the District Court for the District of Columbia, which has
statutory power to “pre-clear” jurisdictions.192 The state of Louisiana
did not seek preclearance but instead moved ahead with its planned
takeover of the New Orleans Public Schools with the impression that
the state takeover was temporary and that power would presumably be
given back to the voters of Orleans Parish once the schools were
achieving adequately.193 The state of Louisiana rushed into taking over
189. Cf. Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6; Gaining
Choice, supra note 15, at 246–47 (all at some point questioning the length of the temporary
takeover of New Orleans’ public schools).
190. Id.
191. Danielle Dreilinger, Second Recovery Charter Votes to Return to Orleans Parish System,
NOLA.COM (Jan. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/01/second
_recovery_charter_votes.html (reporting that only two “recovered” schools have returned to local
control after Hurricane Katrina enabled the charter school takeover of New Orleans’ public
schools only). Although several charter schools are reportedly eligible for return to local control,
the self-selected school boards of those schools have refused to cede power to the popularly
elected and predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board.
192. See generally Williams, supra note 90.
193. Cf. Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Nelson, Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6;
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the public schools in New Orleans without adequate considerations for
protecting the right of Blacks in New Orleans to influence education
policy and/or the politics of education. The city of New Orleans is a
decade into its school reform experiment, and despite allegations that
the city’s public schools are achieving academic success, only two
schools have returned to the governance of the popularly elected and
predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board.194 Similarly, few
schools have opened under the guidance of the reformed and now highperforming Orleans Parish School Board.195 For some time, the state
refused to allow the opening of additional public schools under the
Orleans Parish School Board although parents, community members
and advocates have long sought the opening of additional Orleans
Parish Public Schools through the renovation and reestablishment of
once failed and closed schools.196
The state’s refusal to open new schools under the Orleans Parish
Board is perplexing because—taken alone—the schools operating
under the Orleans Parish School Board rank as the second highest
performing schools in the state of Louisiana.197 In essence, the state has
placed the responsibility of returning charter schools to the Orleans
Parish School Board with the predominately White, self-selected
charter school boards themselves, which in some ways abdicates the
state’s duty to protect Black voters’ political participation.198 The
transition of the governing structure of New Orleans’ public schools
raises concerns that Black voters may not have sufficient entrée points
to influence education policy and the politics of education by way of
the electoral process, if Black voters have any entrée points at all.
Gaining Choice, supra note 15, at 246–47 (acknowledging the need for drastic reforms in New
Orleans’ public schools but questioning whether the reform movement has run its course).
194. Dreilinger, supra note 191.
195. Louisiana Department of Education, Performance Scores, http://www.louisianabelieves
.com/resources/library/performance-scores, (establishing that the district performance score for
Orleans Parish trails only the district performance score for the schools comprising the City of
Zachary, Louisiana’s public schools) [hereinafter Performance Scores].
196. Danielle Dreilinger, John Mac, Black High School, Goes to Diverse Bricolage
Elementary, NOLA.COM (Apr. 22, 2015; 5:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.
ssf/2015/04/john_mac_goes_to_bricolage_cha.html (reporting that a diverse school, which is
predominately White in an almost exclusively Black school district, will receive a newly renovated
school district over the wishes of Black community activists who requested a new school for high
school students that would be operated by the popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board).
197. See Performance Scores, supra note 195.
198. See generally Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6;
Gaining Choice , supra note 15, at 246–47 (all stating that the rise of disproportionately White and
self-selected charter school boards shunts the political involvement of the predominately Black
voting age population of New Orleans and the stakeholders of the city’s public schools).
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Moreover, the state’s takeover of New Orleans’ public schools appears
to support scholarly arguments that the New Orleans charter school
experiment developed with racial animus.199 The state takeover of the
New Orleans public schools does not appear to be temporary, appears
to affect the long-range political power of Black voters in New Orleans
and perhaps developed from racially discriminatory purposes.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not forbid the change from
an elected to an appointed school board—or in this case, the splitting
of power from a solely elected and predominately Black school board
to predominately self-selected and predominately White charter school
boards. Section 5 merely requires that the federal government, in some
capacity, assure that the political voice and participation of minority
voters, through the election process, is not circumvented.200 Though
there is evidence that the state of Louisiana sought emergency
preclearance for temporary changes to voting procedures that were
prompted by Hurricane Katrina,201 it is unlikely that the federal
government granted the state of Louisiana an indefinite right to breach
the voting protections of Black voters in New Orleans. Unfortunately,
Black voters in New Orleans have little recourse, despite the continued
existence of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.202 With no enforceable
Section 5, the state of Louisiana is presumably allowed to alter
selection processes for school governance and the development and
implementation of educational policy through the conversion of
elected posts to appointive and/or self-selected posts. Neither Section
2 nor Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is a viable option to prevent
the disproportionate appointment of White charter school board
members, even when such appointments specifically and
simultaneously end-run the electoral wishes of Black voters and mute
Black political participation in educational policy and politics. Whether
intentional or inadvertent, the conversion of elected posts to
appointive posts in predominately Black jurisdictions has the ability to
shift educational policy and the politics of education. And in some
cases, it may reify the presence and influence of White enclaves in

199. Buras, supra note 29, at 19–32.
200. It is important to note that the federal government’s evaluation(s) under Section 5 does
not result in immediate and/or automatic denial of a jurisdiction’s proposed voting processes.
201. See generally Williams, supra note 90.
202. The Supreme Court of the United States made Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
ineffective through its decision in Shelby County, which invalidated the trigger statute for
requiring preclearance, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. See supra notes 65–102 and
accompanying text.
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educational policy and politics despite the decreasing numbers of these
White enclaves (in raw count and percentages).203
III. FALSE HOPE FOR AND FAILED PROMISES OF EQUALITY: THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ONLY PROTECTS MINORITIES FROM
DISPROPORTIONATE APPOINTMENT OF WHITE CHARTER SCHOOL
BOARD MEMBERS IN THEORY
It is difficult, if not impossible, for the Voting Rights Act to regulate
the disproportionate installation of White stakeholders on self-selected
charter schools. The Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”) of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a
potential alternate limiting force on the disproportionate appointment
of White Americans on appointed charter school boards in New
Orleans. The EPC204 prohibits states from treating similarly situated
citizens in disparate manners based upon classification status or from
impeding citizens’ fundamental rights guaranteed in the
Constitution.205 Part III of this article will focus on the promise of
equitable appointments that is ostensibly assured through the Equal
Protection Clause. First, Part III will discuss the scrutiny and burdens
of proof necessary to warrant a successful claim under the EPC to
determine how federal courts have decided discretionary appointment
decisions. Second, an analysis of federal court decisions on the
constitutionality of discretionary and mandatory appointments sheds
light on the development and current status of the law on this topic.
Finally, Part III applies the EPC to determine whether charter school
board appointments in New Orleans are sufficiently discretionary thus
escaping protection under the Equal Protection Clause.
A. How the Federal Courts Have Defined the Powers of the Equal
Protection Clause
To determine if state law or policy violates the EPC, federal courts
have applied different levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate
203. That White enclaves have been able to control education policy and the politics of
education is not unique to New Orleans. Minority stakeholders and allies of minority stakeholders
battle the same enclaves in other areas of the country. See Erica Frankenberg, Preston C. Green
III & Steven L. Nelson, Fighting “Demographic Destiny”: A Legal Analysis of Attempts of the
Strategies that White Enclaves Might Use to Maintain School Segregation, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 39 (2013).
204. The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
205. Derek W. Meinecke & David W. Adamany, Note, School Reform in Detroit and Public
Act 10: A Decisive Legislative Effort with an Uncertain Outcome, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 9 (2001).
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scrutiny, and rational basis. These courts’ application of strict scrutiny
depends particularly on two factors: whether the policy/law burdens a
suspect class of people,206 and/or whether the policy/law burdens
certain fundamental rights as found in the U.S. Constitution. To
withstand a strict scrutiny analysis, the state must show that the
infringement of the fundamental right or the discrimination of a
suspect class of people (e.g., sex or race) serves a compelling interest
and employs narrowly tailored measures to effectuate that interest.207
Typically, the application of a strict scrutiny analysis would result in a
finding that the law was unconstitutional.208 Absent such qualifications
to warrant a strict scrutiny analysis, the courts have typically adopted a
rational basis standard to determine the constitutionality of the state
law.209 To withstand a rational basis analysis, the government must only
show that it had a legitimate reason for the classification.210 State
statutes usually survive most challenges under the rational basis
standard.211 The rational basis standard and application can be
described:
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification. Where there are
“plausible reasons” for Congress’ action, “our inquiry is at an
end.”212

For the analysis of the constitutionality of discretionary appointed
school boards, two rights are aptly discussed: the right to education and
the right to vote. Education is neither stated nor guaranteed in the
Constitution and is therefore not considered a fundamental right to
warrant strict scrutiny analysis.213 Students’ right to education are not
burdened by the reorganization from an elected school board structure
to an appointed one, especially if evidence exists that the previous
206. Classifications that survive strict scrutiny are race, national origin, religion, and alienage.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
207. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
208. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VANDERBILT L. REV. 793 (2006). From 1990–2003, the
application of strict scrutiny in published final rulings in federal cases would result in the survival
of 30% of the challenged laws. Id. at 813.
209. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
212. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (citations omitted).
213. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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school system had proven ineffective.214 The Fourth Circuit case, Irby v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, lists a number of reasons for states to
implement an appointed school board structure that withstand the
rational basis review:
(i) Insulating school governance matters from direct political
pressures; (ii) promoting stable school board membership; (iii)
encouraging the service of individuals who would not seek elective
office; (iv) promoting diversity in viewpoints which otherwise may
not achieve representation on an elected school board; (v) avoiding
the division of fiscal authority among multiple elected bodies; (vi)
avoiding the fragmentation of local political authority; (vii) avoiding
the problem of single issue campaigns which frequently occur with
elected school boards.215

However, the Court has determined that citizens have a
constitutionally protected right to “participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction” and violations of this right
should trigger a strict scrutiny analysis.216 Inquiries regarding whether
citizens are disenfranchised when the legislature substitutes elected
school boards for appointed school boards have been analyzed under
the supposition of the fundamental right to vote. The Supreme Court,
however, has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to only
invalidate laws that purposely discriminate.217 Challenges to facially
neutral state actions that have discriminatory effects on a suspect class
or fundamental right will not sustain an EPC claim, leaving the decision
to enact a disparate impact claim to legislation.218 For example, in City
of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court indicated that there could be no
violation of the EPC regarding the right to vote if there is no purposeful
or intentional discrimination in voting. Bolden, instead, hinted that
discriminatory purpose could be inferred in seemingly discriminatory
neutral laws (for example, the purpose of the law can be explained on
grounds apart from race) if there is other evidence that supports a
214. See Meinecke, supra note 205 (In the 1990’s, majority Black cities, Cleveland, Chicago,
and Baltimore school boards were taken over by the state or city, due to patterns of school board
ineffectiveness. In response, state law substituted elected school board systems for a discretionary
appointed system).
215. Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1989).
216. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (articulating the “one man, one vote” principle).
217. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
218. Richard A. Primus, Note, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, no. 2. (2003). See also Bolden, 446 U.S. 55; Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(zoning); Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (employment).
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finding of discriminatory purpose.219 In relation to this study, minority
plaintiffs arguing that state laws validating discretionary school board
appointments disproportionately excluding minority groups from the
school board violates their right to vote must prove that the laws have
a discriminatory purpose infringing on their right to participate equally
in elections in order to sustain an EPC claim.
B. The Constitutionality of Discretionary School Board Appointments
While the Court appears to address the concept of discretionary
board appointments, no case law exists that explicitly discusses the
concept of mandatory board appointments. From the Court’s available
intimations, the nucleus of the difference between discretionary and
mandatory appointments appears to be that discretionary
appointments provide broad latitude in the limits of what person or
groups of persons may be selected to fulfill the vacant position whereas
mandatory appointments require the appointing officer to appoint
specific persons or groups of person to fulfill the open position. In the
case of mandatory appointments, the person or group of persons need
only be specified by title and/or position alone; an individual need not
be named to fill the spot.220 Much more problematic is the fact that the
Court has given no instruction on when jurisdictions must or should
use mandatory as opposed to discretionary appointments. The absence
of judicial guidance is salient because there is no legally recognized
right to challenge discretionary appointments. The federal courts have
made some pronouncements using the EPC, specifically related to
discretionary appointment decisions. These pronouncements relate to
the burdens of proof attached to EPC inquiries needed to determine
whether laws substituting elected school boards for appointed school
boards violate the Constitution.
219. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 70 (“[D]isproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and
courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose.”).
220. See Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974). This case attempts to
provide examples of discretionary and, to an abstract extent, mandatory appointments. The
Mayor of Philadelphia must make appointments to the School Board from among nominees
submitted by the Nominating Panel (discretionary/ mandatory). The Mayor appoints four
members to the Panel from the citizenry at large (discretionary), and then the remaining members
of the Panel must be the highest ranking officer of one of the nine categories of citywide
organizations or institutions “such as a labor union council, a commerce organization, a public
school parent-teachers association, a degree-granting institution of higher learning, discretionary
appointments” (discretionary/ mandatory). Id. at 606. The Court never explicitly identifies
mandatory appointments nor gives guidance as to the rights attached to such appointments.
However, the Court does hint at such appointments in this case because it implies that there are
clear titles attached to who can or cannot be appointed to the Nominating Panel.
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First, the courts have recognized that discretionary appointed
school boards do not necessarily violate the right to vote under the
Constitution. Beginning with Sailors v. Kent Board of Education, the
Court determined that the right to vote does not apply to appointed
school board cases.221 In Sailors, the appellants brought an EPC claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment in response to a Michigan statute
that took away the power to elect county school boards from the
qualified school electors, and placed it in the hands of delegates from
elected local school boards to appoint the county school board;
therefore, violating the “one man one vote” principle articulated in
Reynolds v. Simms. The Court disagreed and stated, “We find no
constitutional reason why state or local officers of the non-legislative
character involved here may not be chosen by the governor, by the
legislature, or by some other appointive means rather than by an
election.”222
The Court argued that the “one man one vote” principle was not
relevant in this case, and did not impinge the right to vote because the
county school board serves an essential administrative (not legislative)
function223 of the state. Such reasoning hinged on the need for state
governments to be flexible, and “experiment with new techniques” to
meet changing conditions of urban school districts specifically for nonlegislative officers. The State has the discretion to choose whether to
appoint, elect, or combine the two mechanisms to determine nonlegislative positions.224
Second, because discretionary appointed school boards are
allowed, in cases where discretionary appointments disproportionately
exclude minorities, plaintiffs must prove that the law in question has a
discriminatory intent under the EPC. Federal courts have applauded
the application of statistical analysis to the prevalence (or lack thereof)
of minority representation on appointed boards, yet these same courts
221. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
222. Id. at 108.
223. Id.at 110. In Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), the Court
answered the question left by Sailors determining whether a State may constitute a local
legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process. In terms of distinguishing
between “legislative” and “administrative” officers, the Court rejected the distinction because
“governmental activities ‘cannot easily be classified in neat categories.’” Id. at 56. The Court held
that “as a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular
election to perform governmental [or legislative] functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to
participate in that election.” Id.
224. Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110–11.
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have cautioned against the overreliance on statistical analysis of board
membership to prove discriminatory intent in laws that are facially
neutral. For example, in 1974, the Court opined in Mayor of
Philadelphia v. Equal Education Equal League that Philadelphia’s
structure of appointed discretionary school boards was
constitutional.225 The public education amendment to the Philadelphia
city charter approved in 1965 changed the school board structure to
allow the Mayor to appoint nine members to the School Board; the
mayor was allowed to choose appointees from names submitted by the
Nominating Panel.226 The claimants argued that the Mayor
unconstitutionally disqualified Blacks from membership of the
Nominating Panel, because the percentage of Blacks was woefully
underrepresented to those on the Nominating Panel (15%) as
compared to the city (34%) and student body of the public school
system (60%). In multiple cases, federal courts have determined that
statistics do not adequately indicate the racial animus needed to prove
racial discrimination of appointments to discretionarily appointed
boards.227 The Court found that there was not enough evidence in the
record to warrant a finding of racial discrimination.228 Moreover, not all
citizens are equally capable of serving on certain boards, especially
when those boards have required or recommended skill sets. With
discretionary decisions, the “relevant universe for comparison purposes
consists of the highest-ranking officers of the categories of
organizations and institutions specified in the city charter, not the
population at large.”229 According to the Court in Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Company, “when special qualifications are required to fill
particular jobs, comparisons to the general populations . . . may have
little probative value.”230
225. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
226. Id..
227. Id. at 620–21.
228. Id. at 616–620. The Court indicated that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals finding of a
prima facie case racial discrimination was incorrect. The Court of Appeals decision rested on 1)
“ambiguous” testimony as to a statement by Mayor Tate in 1969 (newspaper account stating that
he would not appoint no Negroes to the Board, even though two Negroes were already on the
Board), in regards to the 1969 school board, not of the 1971 Panel; 2) Unawareness of Black
organizations that could serve on the Panel of a city official who did not have the final authority
to challenge appointments; and 3) The Supreme Court found that racial composition comparisons
was “meaningless” in the context of this case.
229. Id. at 620–21. The District Court’s concern for the smallness of the sample presented by
the 13-member Panel was also well founded.
230. 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (quotation omitted); see also Mayor of Phila., 415 U.S. at 620;
Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882
F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989).

NELSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/10/2016 5:41 PM

HOUSE OF CARDS: FEDERAL COURTS AND SCHOOL BOARDS

187

While the Court is correct to be suspicious of statistics that contain
a small n-value, the Court’s reasoning has extended to situations in
which Blacks have been absolutely excluded from participation on
discretionarily appointed boards. Conversely, four years prior to Equal
Education League, the Court found that the exclusion of Blacks from
the grand jury commission that selected the school board represented
a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose under the EPC. In Turner
v. Fouche, a judge-appointed jury commission selected the grand jury,
which in turn selected the school board.231 The Georgia system gave the
jury commission discretion to exclude anyone not “upright” and
“intelligent” from the grand jury list.232 This method in itself did not
violate any particular suspect class and thus did not violate the
Constitution. However, the jury commissioners used the method to
overwhelmingly exclude Blacks from the grand jury list.233 The
elimination of 171 Blacks out of the 178 total citizens disqualified for
lack of “intelligence” or “uprightness” from the roster of potential
jurors was found to be proof of “invidious discrimination.”234
In Searcy v. Williams,235 the Fifth Circuit used the Turner analysis to
determine if a school board’s discretionary appointment selection
methods proved to be unconstitutional. In Searcy, Black voters brought
a claim of racial discrimination challenging the compositional makeup
and method of selection of a school board under a particular Georgia
charter. In this instance, from 1915 to 1970, the all White board of
trustees would elect (appoint) a new board member. Within that time
frame no Black person served on the school board until the lawsuit was
filed. The Fifth Circuit found the law to be constitutional on its face
because the law did not require that the school board be composed of
only white members. Therefore, the discriminatory purpose was
inferred from overwhelming statistical evidence to explain the
disparity, and fulfilled the high burden articulated in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.236 The White school boards’ subjective selection of new
members that excluded Blacks for sixty-one years was found to be
highly discriminatory. The court held that appointed school board
systems are permissible under the EPC of the Fourteenth Amendment
“so long as the appointments are not made in a manner that
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

396 U.S. 346, 348 (1970).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 359.
656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980).
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systematically excludes an element of the population from
consideration.”237 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit indicated that there is
a difference between elected and appointed selections. In an election,
the fact that the citizenry did not elect Blacks does not indicate that the
election is discriminatory, but a system of appointments, which totally
excludes Blacks, should be an indicator of discrimination.238
The Searcy case is important because the Fifth Circuit explicitly
stated that the Equal Protection Clause would be more useful than the
Voting Rights Act at evaluating the proportionality and inclusiveness
of minority citizens on appointed school boards.239 The Fifth Circuit’s
broad interpretation of Equal Education League,240 combined with a
denial of voting rights protection, gives rise to an implied promise that
the Equal Protection Clause will protect minority populations from
disproportionate appointments of Whites on appointed school boards.
If Blacks cannot rely on the Voting Rights Act and its expansive
coverage to protect them from exclusion from the political process,
Black voters must be able to rely on the EPC to force the inclusion of
minorities in the appointment process.241 Otherwise, minorities may be
left without the law’s protection from disproportionate appointment of
Whites to appointed school boards. Yet, the current state of the law
seems to require total exclusion from discretionary appointment
decisions of minority populations to warrant a discriminatory purpose
characterization of neutral policies, which is an extremely high bar to
overcome.
Third, the Court recognized that judicial oversight of discretionary
appointments made by elected officials might interfere with an elected
official’s capacity to serve the electorate.242 As addressed in Equal
Education League, the Court exclusively discussed the “delicate”
nature of federal-state relationships in the application of the
237. Searcy, 656 F.2d at 1009.
238. Id. at 1003.
239. Id. at 1009.
240. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
241. See Searcy, 656 F.2d at 1009.
242. This point was not used in the Court’s ultimate decision to declare that the Mayor’s
appointments did not violate the Constitution. However, the Court exclusively discussed the
“delicate” nature of federal-state relationships in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment,
specifically in regards to the federal government’s promise to protect minority rights in contention
with a state’ executive’s discretionary power to appoint members to certain positions. See Carter
v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (finding that an Alabama law allowing the
Governor to make discretionary appointments to a county jury commission, on its face did not
violate the Constitution, even though the appointments completely excluded Blacks from
service). See also Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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Fourteenth Amendment, specifically in regards to the federal
government’s promise to protect minority rights in contention with a
state executive’s discretionary power to appoint members to certain
positions. Proving that an appointing officer is using a discretionary
appointment in a discriminatory manner requires an arduous burden
of proof even in relation to the behaviors of the appointing officer.243
Even evidence that an appointing officer has acted in a discriminatory
manner in the past will not suffice as probative of the discriminatory
actions of the appointing officer. For example, in Carter v. Jury
Commission of Greene County,244 the Court found that an Alabama law
allowing the Governor to make discretionary appointments to a county
jury commission on its face did not violate the Constitution, even
though the appointments completely excluded Blacks from service.245
In another Alabama case, James v. Wallace,246 the plaintiffs failed to
prove that Governor George Wallace engaged in discrimination against
Blacks in his discretionary appointments to state boards and
commissions, despite Wallace’s history of racial discrimination.247 The
Court denoted that it is the Governor’s duty to represent the people
that elected him, and to carry out policies that were the basis of his
election. Yet such criteria highlight an acceptance of discriminatory
actions by elected officials and do not protect the rights of the minority
population, invalidating the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These three rules articulated by the various federal courts make it
extremely difficult for Black citizens and families to obtain any relief
against
discretionary
school
board
appointments
that
disproportionately exclude Blacks from service. The gravamen of the
situation is that there is no reasonable method by which to challenge
discretionary appointments under the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, the Court has given no guidance on how to identify when an
appointment is mandatory as opposed to discretionary in nature.
Likewise, the difference is illusory because a legislative body could
make all appointments discretionary to enable the employment of
racially discriminatory appointment processes.

243. See Carter, 396 U.S. 320; James v. Wallace, 533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976). In both cases,
plaintiffs provided proof of discriminatory actions, but in neither case was this proof enough to
overcome discretion.
244. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
245. Id.
246. 533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976).
247. Id.
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C. Whether An Appointment is Mandatory or Discretionary
Determines the Amount of Equity Possible Through Charter
School Board Appointments
The self-selections of charter school board members in New
Orleans are discretionary in nature. There are no required persons or
groups of persons that must serve on charter school boards; instead, the
state legislature, primarily through the Louisiana Department of
Education, permits charter school boards to consider a variety of needs
that potential charter school board members may need to fulfill.248
Sitting charter school boards are generally free to self-select whomever
they feel is necessary to make the charter school board function best.249
The promise of regulating charter school board self-selections so
that the boards achieve some form of racial parity as compared to preKatrina numbers relies heavily on the mechanism for making the
appointment of the charter school board. On their face, discretionary
appointments might only assure equitable appointments of charter
school boards if the appointing officer is invested in creating a charter
school board resembling the community at-large or the appointing
officer is dedicated to diversity in some other form. The use of
mandatory appointments, although much more restrictive and contrary
to the charter school movement’s ideals of autonomy, may produce
greater opportunities for involvement from minority communities
because mandatory appointments would allow for Black stakeholders
to challenge the appointments (or lack thereof) of Black charter school
board members. Despite the importance of the distinction between
mandatory and discretionary appointments, discussed above,250 the
federal courts have never explicitly defined when an appointment
would be classified in either category. Although courts do not give
explicit guidance on differentiating mandatory and discretionary
appointments, they have instead indirectly elucidated the terms under
which a government appointment may be discretionary.
Based on an analysis of the federal court’s definitions of
discretionary
appointments,
mandatory
appointments,
or
appointments that presumably dictate a prescribed person to be
included on a board, would likely better assure the inclusion of
248. LOUISIANA DEP’T. OF EDUCATION, LOUISIANA BELIEVES: LOUISIANA CHARTER
SCHOOL PERFORMANCE COMPACT: CHARTER SCHOOL BOARDS, http://www.louisianabelieves.
com/docs/school-choice/faq—-charter-board.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited June 26, 2016).
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 231–52 and accompanying text.
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minority groups on charter school boards than discretionary
appointments, or appointments made at the caprice of the appointing
officer. This is necessarily the case because mandatory appointments,
by definition, should require that the appointing officer select certain
individuals to serve on the charter school board. An example of such a
requirement might be that charter school boards must appoint at least
three parents to the charter school board. Because the majority of
charter schools in New Orleans are predominately Black (and some are
exclusively Black), the appointment of parents might assure that Blacks
would be present on charter school boards in more measurable
numbers.251 Requiring a parental proxy would not be a foolproof
method of assuring Black representation, but the parental proxy does
at a minimum open the door to more proportional representation for
Blacks on New Orleans’ self-selected charter school boards.
The marquee difference in the courts’ handling of the different
types of government appointments appears to be that the federal
courts may be more apt to resolve issues of mandatory appointments
through the Equal Protection Clause although this is not explicitly clear
from the courts’ holdings. The federal courts have abdicated their duty
to resolve questions of discretionary appointments by treating the
discretionary appointments as non-justiciable political questions.252 By
treating discretionary appointments as non-justiciable political
questions, the Court has explicitly made appointing officers and their
discretionary appointments only answerable at the voting booth.253
Minorities, by definition, may not have the political power to hold
appointing officers accountable at the voting booth, especially when
251. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7
252. See James v. Wallace, 533 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1976). The court held that the plaintiffs
in an Equal Protection Clause claim did not meet the burden of proof required for the federal
courts to intervene in discretionary appointments, which is a political question. Id. The Fifth
Circuit argued that the Alabama electors desired policies supported by the Wallace
administration. Id. The court did not find the appointments of Governor Wallace to be violative
of the Equal Protection Clause simply because the governor had 1) appointed Blacks to less than
1% of available positions, 2) had openly argued for the oppression of Blacks, 3) had previously
been investigated for racially oppressive is the appointment of his executive branch and 4) the
federal courts had already had to intervene in the actions of many of the boards in question. Id at
964-968. These factors did not give pause to the court; instead, they give more credence to
Wallace’s attestation that he was objective and fair in his appointment of officials although such
an attestation would fly in the face of facts. Id. at 968.
253. Id. If George Wallace’s racist past and current actions did not raise the ire of the federal
courts, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance under which the courts would find that a
discretionary appointment was violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, the only
protections assuring equitable appointments to government left to would-be-plaintiffs is to
replace, by way of the voting process, the offending appointing officer.
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juxtaposed against White voters.254 Because of the gap in civil rights
protections for minorities, minority citizens are at the mercy of White
voters; thus, minorities can rely only on the protections in the voting
process because there is no ability to hold appointed officers
accountable through the Equal Protection Clause. This reasoning
reveals a glaring hole in civil rights protections for minorities. Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act does not protect minorities’ stakes in
appointed boards because Section 2 does not contemplate the
protection of appointed posts.255 Voting Rights Act cases encourage the
use of the Equal Protection Clause to rectify issues associated with
appointed boards.256 Yet the case law on appointed boards does not
protect against disproportionate discretionary appointments of White
Americans.257 To assure that minority parents have access to judicial
tools to address disproportionate appointments of White Americans,
charter school boards should consider the use of mandatory, rather
than discretionary appointments, in choosing successive board
members.
Although the self-selection of charter school board members in
New Orleans’ public charter schools are most likely discretionary, some
of the federal courts’ reasoning supporting discretionary appointments
is not sustainable if society is to pursue racial equity. There are no
elected officials that can be held directly accountable for the selfselection of charter school board members.258 For instance, charter
school board member self-selections traditionally rely on seated

254. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413 (1991) (questioning the efficacy of minority safe districts to impact the legislative process
and concluding that majority safe districts might merely transfer discrimination from the electoral
process into the legislative process, where such discrimination is not statutorily banned).
255. See Searcy v. Williams, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989); Mixon v. Ohio, 139 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999) (all holding against or
explicitly questioning whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights applies to non-elected school
boards. Combined with Shelby County, Section 2 nor Section 5 protect minority stakeholders
against the disproportionate appointment of White board members—or perhaps—complete
exclusion of Black board members).
256. Searcy, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); Irby, 889 F.2d 1352; Mixon, 139 F.3d 389 (all of
these cases, at the minimum, suggest that Section 5 is the appropriate provision of the Voting
Rights Act for regulating appointed school boards).
257. See Mayor of Phila. v. Edu. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
258. The only mechanism for altering the operation of any one charter school in the state of
Louisiana would be to gain a majority on the Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education. Unfortunately, each voter can only cast one vote for membership on the Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education. Those votes are within districts, so voters in New Orleans
would have to hope that voters across the state would join the voters of New Orleans in attempting
to overthrow the current school reform movement.
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charter school board members to appoint replacement board
members.259 Given the structure of the Recovery School District and
the state takeover of the New Orleans Public Schools, there are no
elected officials in the direct line of accountability to parents and
students in New Orleans. In fact, the only elected officials that are
indirectly accountable to parents and students in New Orleans are the
members of the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education
(“BESE”). New Orleans shares a BESE member with Jefferson Parish
(a suburb of New Orleans); thus, this board member is not directly and
solely answerable to a New Orleans constituency and could be duly
reelected notwithstanding widespread opposition from the City of New
Orleans.260

IV. HOW THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE CONSPIRE TO UNDO PROGRESS IN SCHOOL BOARD
REPRESENTATION FOR BLACKS
That neither the Voting Rights Act nor the Equal Protection Clause
adequately protect the political interests of minorities is abundantly
clear. Although the Supreme Court has failed to address the suitability
of applying the Voting Rights Act to nonelected school boards, the
federal appellate courts have been in near accord on the issue. With the
possible exception of the Fourth Circuit, the federal appellate courts
have summarily rejected the application of the Voting Rights Act to
nonelected school boards. The Supreme Court—unlike in the case of
the Voting Rights Act’s application to nonelected school boards—has
decided on the application of the EPC to nonelected boards. Although
the Court has unequivocally stated that the EPC should prohibit the
exclusion of minorities from appointed boards, the Court’s decisions
have not met this admirable standard. In fact, the Court and other
lower federal courts have overtly declined to apply the EPC as a
limiting force on the disproportionate appointment of White
Americans and the exclusion of minorities on school boards (and other
boards). Part IV of this Article addresses how the federal courts’
decisions in Voting Rights Act and EPC cases collude to produce an

259. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
260. Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, About BESE, Map of BESE Districts,
http://bese.louisiana.gov/about-bese/map-of-bese-districts (showing that the Second District for
the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and extends north and west along the
Mississippi River to include parts of the New Orleans and Baton Rouge metropolitan areas).
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acerbic gap in civil rights coverage for Black stakeholders in New
Orleans’ public schools.
A. New Orleans’ Charter School Boards Are Able to End-Run Section
2 of The Voting Rights Act Through the Establishment of
Appointed Charter School Boards Without A Functioning Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act
The Court’s holding in Shelby County v. Holder261 was ostensibly
not an educational equity issue, but the Court’s most recent Voting
Rights Act decision has broad implications for Black stakeholders in
New Orleans’ charter schools. By invalidating Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act and thereby making Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
unenforceable, 262 the Supreme Court disallowed the last viable option
to restrict the disproportionate self-selection of White charter school
board members. A functioning Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act could
force charter school boards, which are replacing the popularly elected
school board in New Orleans, to obtain preclearance before
implementing their self-selective procedures. The state takeover of
New Orleans’ public schools and the subsequent stripping of power
from the Orleans Parish School Board were pitched as a temporary fix
to the failing school system. Nearly a decade later—and with the once
failing school district ranked as the second highest performing school
district in the state—only two schools have voted to return to the
district and relatively few schools have been opened under the district’s
leadership (despite a growing student population263 and a demand from
local parents and advocates).264 It does not seem imminent that there
will be a return to power or mass reopening of new schools under the
district’s leadership; thus, it is hardly arguable that the transition of
power over schools from the popularly elected Orleans Parish School
Board to the appointed leadership of charter school boards is anything
but permanent.

261. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
262. Id. at 2631.
263. See Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans School Count Flattens for 1st Time Since Katrina,
NOLA.COM (Nov. 18, 2015; 5:02 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/
11/new_orleans_school_enrollment_2.html#incart_river; Danielle Dreilinger, See Where New
Orleans Public School Enrollment is Growing, NOLA.COM (Nov. 18, 2015: 3:08 PM),
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/11/opsb_enrollment_2015_special_e.html
(together finding that enrollment in New Orleans’ public schools is shrinking, but enrollment in
schools under the popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board is increasing as more room for
students is granted, mostly by designing new, larger buildings).
264. Dreilinger, supra note 196.
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An unenforceable Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forces Black
parents in New Orleans to rely on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
counter disproportionate self-selection of Whites on charter school
boards. Reliance on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to impede the
disproportionate appointment of White charter school board members
is a precarious proposition, if not totally misplaced. Only one federal
court has ever entertained the notion of applying Section 2 to
nonelected boards.265 That court ultimately decided to forego the
application of Section 2 to nonelected boards.266 Minority parents in
New Orleans have an even larger obstacle to overcome. Specifically, the
Fifth Circuit, which oversees the city of New Orleans, has already
foreclosed the application of Section 2 to nonelected school boards and
presumably self-selected charter school boards in Searcy.267 Minority
parents in New Orleans, therefore, must hope for a shift in precedent if
they are to use Section 2 to regulate the disproportionate self-selection
of Whites to charter school boards.
B. The Voting Rights Act Is Not Viable for Regulating the Selection
of Charter School Board Members in New Orleans, and the Equal
Protection Clause’s Promise of Equitable Board Selection Is
Illusory
The Voting Rights Act is not a viable statute for regulating the selfselection of charter school board members in New Orleans based on
the federal court’s refusal to apply Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
to nonelected school boards. Although New Orleans’ Black voters
could have potentially relied on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to
claim that a change in the voting process requiring preclearance
occurred, Section 5 is no longer enforceable. The time for challenging
Section 5 preclearance failures may have long passed. To be clear,
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not regulate nonelected
selection mechanisms for selecting school boards because federal
courts have found that Section 5 contemplates such regulation and
EPC similarly targets disproportionate appointment policies and
procedures. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is, unfortunately, no
longer enforceable. Courts are only allowed to use the EPC when
appointments are mandatory. The self-selection of charter school board
members in New Orleans is best characterized as discretionary.
265. Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989).
266. Id.
267. Searcy v. Williams, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
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The federal court’s refusal to apply Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to appointed school boards is further complicated by the fact that
the Supreme Court has offered an illusory promise of regulating the
appointment of boards via the EPC. In sum, the federal courts have
nearly uniformly denied minority parents the use of the Voting Rights
Act to combat the inequitable appointment of school board members.
Black voters seeking to assure proportional racial self-selections to
charter school boards can rely only on the EPC. The Equal Protection
Clause’s promise of equitable appointive representation lacks
enforceability because of the Court’s interpretation of the EPC. The
federal courts have expressed sympathy for minority parents,
recognizing that the assessment of minority representation on
appointed boards is an intricate matter.268 In New Orleans, Black voters
are statistically underrepresented on reported self-selected charter
school boards. These parents and students have no way to assure
proportional or even equitable representation on these charter school
boards, although Black parents and students controlled educational
policy by way of the elected school board prior to Hurricane Katrina
and the subsequent state takeover and chartering of the school district.
C. The Reasoning of the Court—In Terms of Voter Accountability of
Appointing Officers—Seems Circular At Best and Is Not Directly
Applicable to Self-Selected Boards
As vexing as the problem is, the fact that the charter school
movement has usurped the prominent role of Black stakeholders in
educational policy and politics in New Orleans is not the headline of
the story. There is something much more sinister occurring in New
Orleans (and potentially in other predominately Black areas of the
country). The federal courts—where many civil rights were won for
Blacks—have failed to protect these rights. That the protection of Black
participation in the politics of education and education policy in New
Orleans is faltering is not on its face the basis of insidious activity,
though such an argument could be made. In fact, the erosion of Black
participation and power over education policy and politics in New
Orleans is more the work of the federal court’s impressive bout of
circular reasoning. In essence, it is always some other statute that
should be regulating the attack on Black political power, at least in
terms of educational policy and politics.
268. See Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 331 (1970) (“While there is
force in what the appellants say, we cannot agree that § 21 is irredeemably invalid on its face.”).
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Admittedly, it is hard to argue with the initial reasoning of the
federal appellate courts. The federal courts have never been in the
business of applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to nonelected
school boards. For a wide variety of reasons, the federal courts have
historically relied on the application of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act for the regulation of appointed boards. This alone is not
problematic. It would be unfathomable that the federal government
would monitor every jurisdiction’s alterations of its governance
selection procedures, specifically because some jurisdictions are more
likely to enact legislation and policies that regress the rights of minority
voters. The federal government, therefore, need only closely monitor
the Section 5 jurisdictions for compliance with preclearance because
the history of these jurisdictions implies a greater likelihood that these
jurisdictions would somehow misbehave in regard to protecting
minority political participation. If a jurisdiction does not have a history
of misbehavior in regard to minority voting rights, then potential
claimants would have to prove discriminatory actions by governments
after the enactment of the alleged discriminatory policy rather than
forcing the governmental entities to seek preclearance from the
appropriate parties. The federal courts held steady on this reasoning
with the reliance on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
The reliance on Section 5 to monitor the jurisdictions with the most
troubling histories of voting protections worked well until 2013 when
the Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act and
simultaneously made Section 5 unenforceable. Suddenly, the federal
courts’ reliance on Section 5 to protect Blacks from policies that
transferred elected positions into self-selected positions became
troubling. After 2013, an identification as a Section 5 jurisdiction
carried little to no weight. The loss of the preclearance requirement
received the most press, but there were other changes that could have
more immediate and drastic effects. Jurisdictions that were previously
Section 5 jurisdictions were free to implement any voting changes that
did not violate Section 2. Herein lies the problem: Section 2 does not
regulate nonelected boards. Jurisdictions that were previously blocked
from changing their elected boards into nonelected boards were
suddenly free to do so, opening the pathway to mute Black political
power by nixing the ability of Black voters to gain racial representation
on charter school boards. The federal courts have successfully punted
on the issue of nonelected boards, although Congress had already
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declared the switch from elected to nonelected boards to be suspicious
in light of protecting minority voters.269
Under close scrutiny, however, the federal courts have also failed to
regulate self-selected boards under the EPC. Even when the facts of
challenged cases prove discriminatory intent, discriminatory action and
discriminatory effect originating from the same action, the federal
courts have rejected application of the EPC to appointed boards. Once
again, taken individually, the courts’ arguments appear sound. Elected
officials must be able to select nonelected officials who will best
respond to the wishes of the majority of the electorate. Taken as a
whole, however, the federal courts arguments are troubling. Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act does not protect minority voters from the
disproportionate appointment of White board members because
Section 5 is specifically tasked with this protection. Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act does not protect Black voters from the
disproportionate appointment of White board members because
Section 5 is no longer enforceable. Despite the failure of the Voting
Rights Act to protect Black voters from these transgressions, Black
voters should be able to take solace in the fact that the EPC will protect
Black voters from the disproportionate nonelected selection of White
board members. The EPC analyses of the federal courts, however, rely
on the ability of Black voters—who are uniformly statewide
minorities—to elect statewide candidates that represent the political
views of Black voters. In other words, under the EPC, Black voters may
assure adequate representation on nonelected boards by voting for
candidates who support the electoral wishes of the Black population.
This assumes that Black voters may adequately utilize their rights
under the Voting Rights Act. The reasoning is viciously circular in that
all purported protections are tied to statutes that protect Black voters
only in theory because the statutes rely on each other and are
ineffective because each statute relies on the protections of another
statute with limited enforceability. Moreover, there is an unstated
assumption that each theoretical protection will afford Black voters
and their political voice and participation adequate coverage to
overcome nifty and sanctioned attempts to dilute Black political voice
and participation. It only stands to reason, then, that a predominately
Black city that consistently elects predominately Black school boards
is left with predominately White appointed charter school boards

269. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177.
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governing schools that are predominately Black. It is no coincidence; it
is an attempt by Whites to usurp power over schools and education
policy and politics from Blacks fully knowing that there is no recourse
for these poor Black parents under current federal court precedent.
CONCLUSION
Schools in New Orleans are predominately Black and poor, yet the
governance of these schools is comprised of predominately White
charter school board members. The state takeover of public schools,
which led to the chartering of the public schools, has been hailed as a
revival of parental involvement in New Orleans’ public schools. The
reports of increased parental involvement do not reveal the statistics
used to calculate (or estimate) parental involvement, but an analysis of
Black voting patterns in New Orleans—which almost always lead to a
predominately Black elected school board—suggests that parental
involvement in terms of selecting school leadership on appointed
charter school boards is limited or foreclosed entirely from Black
parents.270 The involvement of White board members may be beneficial
to the schools of New Orleans. New Orleans, which leads the nation in
percentage of students enrolled in private schools, has seen not only
substantial White flight to the suburbs but has also seen an almost
crippling amount of middle-class Black flight to private schools. If these
well-to-do board members are going to attract those families who have
foregone New Orleans’ public schools back to the struggling school
district, then the incorporation of these board members is not only
admirable but likely necessary. There are, however, problems with the
emergence of White charter school board members as the dominant
force in education policy. Research of traditional public schools reveals
that an adequate presence of Black board members and policymakers
correlates to better achievement for Black students.271 It is difficult to
make such statements in the charter school context but is not
unreasonable given the nature of our schools and our society.

270. See Vincent Rossmeier & Patrick Sims, K-12 Public Education Through the Public’s
Eyes: Parents’ and Adults’ Perceptions of Public Education in New Orleans, Cowen Institute for
Public Education Initiatives (2015), http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05
/cowen.poll_.2015.pdf (on file with author) (finding that almost all respondents to a poll support
a return to local control of New Orleans’ public schools); see also Balancing School Choice, supra
note 7.
271. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Although charter school advocates have asserted that Black
parents in New Orleans are “choosing” reform schools for their schoolaged children, the most requested choices for schooling are routinely
those schools governed by the popularly elected Orleans Parish School
Board.272 The combination of forced choice, compulsory attendance
and poverty in New Orleans dictates that even poor performing charter
schools (or those undesirable to Black parents) will enroll some
students, considering nearly all public schools in New Orleans are
charter schools. Even if these parents sought a traditional public school,
the remaining traditional public schools—which are operated by the
popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board—are historically
selective, though this selectivity does not always occur in the admissions
process and few seats are generally available for these high performing
schools.273 The assertion that Black parents in New Orleans are
choosing charter schools is misleading outside of this context and
potentially purposefully skewed. Furthermore, Black voters in New
Orleans continue to elect a predominately Black school board and,
when given the opportunity, predominately Black officials. In the most
glaring example of Black political will to elect Black officials, New
Orleanians elected a Black city council membership—the
predominately Black voting age population of the city handed Black
leaders nearly three-quarters of the city council seats.274 It is difficult to
imagine that Black voters are eager to see Black candidates in all
leadership roles, except those associated with education. In an apparent
nod to this theory, the Louisiana Legislature has recently passed
legislation requiring the Recovery School District to return control of
all public schools in New Orleans to the popularly elected Orleans
Parish School Board.275
272. See EnrollNola, April 2015 Main Round Summary (2015), https://oneappnola.files.
wordpress.com/2015/02/2015-0428-mr-summary1.pdf. Three of the top five elementary schools—
Benjamin Franklin, Alice Harte and Mary Bethune—in the common public school application
process were from the Orleans Parish School Board and all of the top three high schools are
governed by the Orleans Parish School Board—Edna Karr, Eleanor McMain and McDonogh #35.
Id. One must remember that there are almost four times as many schools governed by the
nonelected Recovery School District than are governed by the popularly elected Orleans Parish
School Board, giving these preferences more force. Id.
273. See id. Although many of the schools governed by the Orleans Parish School Board have
been selective admissions, many of these schools dropped their selective admissions after
Hurricane Katrina.
274. Mason Harrison, Black Majority Regained on New Orleans City Council, LOUISIANA
WEEKLY (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/black-majority-regained-on-neworleans-city-council (discussing that the New Orleans City Council would return to having a Black
supermajority in 2011, the first time since the election immediately following Hurricane Katrina).
275. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Katrina School Takeover to End, Legislature Decides,
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The Louisiana Association of Public Charter Schools has launched
an initiative to recruit and train charter school board members.276 If the
Louisiana Association of Public Charter Schools can use this
mechanism to attract, train and retain parents of minority students onto
charter school boards, this will be a step in a positive direction. This step
alone indicates that the charter schools themselves recognize that
involvement of members of the community—perhaps even those who
are racial minorities—is necessary. It is also likely the reason that many
charter school boards have refused to answer questions about minority
membership and participation.277 The charter school association need
not look far for potential solutions for its woes at recruiting, training
and retaining minority board members. The Algiers Charter School
Association, a consortium of charter schools on the Westbank of New
Orleans—a sizeable area in terms of the city’s population—has actively
recruited parents to serve on their charter school board.278 As a result
of these efforts, the Algiers Charter School Association’s board of
directors almost represents its nearly exclusive Black population
proportionally and over-represents the voting age population of the
city of New Orleans.279
Statistically, the charter schools in Algiers continue to see
significant growth in student performance as measured by multiple
indicators of student success. Similarly, the schools enjoy successful
extracurricular activities—a point not as easily made by other charter
schools in the area.280 It is for this reason that charter schools in New
Orleans should pursue the use of a parental proxy. Actively recruiting
parents—specifically Black parents—to their charter school boards
will, in effect, alter the composition of charter school boards to make
the appointed school boards more reflective of the city and the school
district populations.
The sample size of the schools responding to the survey regarding
board composition is insufficient to make adequate findings regarding
all charter school boards in New Orleans. This is, in part, because

TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 5, 2016), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2016/05/new_orleans
_schools_reunify.html.
276. Louisiana Association of Public Charter Schools, Programs & Resources, Top Shelf,
http://lacharterschools.org/programs-resources/the-top-shelf/.
277. Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Walker-Landry High School has competed at high levels in athletics and band, both
important to the culture of New Orleans’ public school students.

NELSON (DO NOT DELETE)

202

10/10/2016 5:41 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:1

charter schools have no reason to respond to criticisms regarding board
appointments and race. No state or federal agency tracks the racial
composition of charter school boards. In fact, some charter school
boards admitted that the boards themselves do not keep track of this
information. This news is startling because there is ample research on
the connection between board racial representation and student
achievement in traditional public schools. Charter schools, which
profess to be better equipped to serve unique populations, including
minority students, should be invested in keeping information that could
better prove the efficacy of charter schools to create more equitable
schools and higher student achievement. State and federal
policymakers should insist that charter schools not only collect but also
distribute information on the racial composition of their boards, if only
to give another point of evaluation of the effect of charter schools on
minority communities and the participation and voice of minority
communities in educational policy and politics.
Currently, New Orleans’ public charter schools find support in
improved School Performance Scores, which are comprised mostly of
test scores on state assessments.281 These improvements remain
questionable because the state of Louisiana often changes the scale and
scoring of schools, such that it is difficult to evaluate the change in a
school’s score on a year-to-year basis. Furthermore, Louisiana students
continue to decline in performance on some nationally normed tests,
despite gains on state tests.282 Finally, test scores cannot be the only
measure worthy of inclusion in evaluating school success. In a highprofile national story, a young man and public school student in New
Orleans who was praised for his commitment to social justice was
gunned down in the streets of New Orleans.283 Students who are out of
schools, for whatever reason, are more likely to be engaged in these
acts, as perpetrators or victims. Adequate measures of student
achievement must transcend test scores and include items such as
suspension, graduation, and dropout rates, as well as many other

281. See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6 (citing that the state of Louisiana has complete control
of the state-based tests but not the national tests, which might be the cause of the disparate scores
of the same students).
282. See id. (questioning the rapid increases in the state-based achievement scores of students
in New Orleans’ public schools in light of recent national test results showing general stasis, if not
a general decline, in achievement).
283. Johnathan Bullington, For New Orleans, Teen’s Death the Loss of a “Visionary”,
Educators Say, NOLA.COM (Oct. 23, 2014; 12:02 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/
2014/10/for_new_orleans_teens_death_th.html).
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measures. Thus far, analysis of the charter school takeover in New
Orleans does not reflect a story of urban education renewal.284 Schools
in New Orleans must be tasked with more than achieving higher test
scores. They must revive the hope of a city. This may be unfair, but it is
a reality. How can one be hopeful and continuously deprived of the
ability to affect the policies that dictate one’s life?

284. See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6 (finding links between better student outcomes, aside
from grades, for schools with some political accountability as opposed to schools without any
political accountability to the public).

